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 
Abstract—Agriculture remains a sensitive issue during 
multilateral trade negotiations within the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Similar problems arise at the bilateral level, as in the case of 
trade talks between the United States and the Dominican Republic. The 
study explores the determinant of agricultural industry 
competitiveness in the 21st century, particularly in the case of U.S. and 
Dominican agriculture in each other’s market. Complementing 
existing scholarship on industry competitiveness, the study argues that 
trade rules that are established under preferential access programs and 
trade agreements play a significant role in shaping an industry’s ability 
to compete. The final analysis is used to offer recommendations to the 
same sector in Cuba. Cuba currently relies heavily on U.S. food 
imports and is experiencing the gradual opening of trade with the 
United States.  
 
Keywords—Agriculture, bargaining, competitiveness, Dominican 
Republic, DR-CAFTA, free trade agreement, institutions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE Dominican Republic, as with many developing 
countries, still relies on agricultural production as an 
important sector for the economy. This sector goes beyond 
meeting the dietary needs of the Dominican population to also 
being an important source of employment and revenue. Due to 
the significance of the industry domestically, many agricultural 
producers were not originally enthusiastic about the Dominican 
Republic entering trade talks with the United States, as 
explained by industry representative José Ramón Peralta and 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
economic policy coordinator Luis González during 2010 
personal interviews in the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, 
the Dominican Republic and the United States concluded talks 
and signed a trade deal in 2004 [1]. The Dominican Republic 
joined the trend of increasing regional and bilateral deals, 
especially since talks at the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
level and hemispheric-wide talks for a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) were fragile surrounding the matter of 
agriculture [2], [3]. Both talks collapsed in 2005 and have yet 
to be revived and concluded [2], [3].  
While U.S. and Dominican producers are faced with 
competing under a reciprocal trade regime, which refers to trade 
deals that have been negotiated by all member countries and are 
supposed to be mutually beneficial, existing models pay 
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minimal attention to the link between trade rules and specific 
market competitiveness. The study explores the role of the 
U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (DR-CAFTA) rules in allowing for specific U.S. 
agricultural commodities to compete in the Dominican 
Republic and vice-versa. The study also looks at business 
associations, particularly from developing economies, in this 
case, the Dominican Republic, in shaping trade rules during 
asymmetrical negotiations with larger, developed economies. 
II. DEFINING COMPETITIVENESS 
It is first important to clarify what competitiveness means. 
The term competitiveness is used regularly by researchers, trade 
theorists, economists, the business community, and 
policymakers when discussing the global economy. However, 
there lacks consensus on what the term means [4]-[6]. As a 
result, studies do not agree on exactly how to measure 
competitiveness and vary on their particular level of analysis—
country, industry, or firm. 
Corporations measure their ability to compete by its bottom 
line and maintaining a strong market performance, without 
which they would no longer exist [4]. At the national level, 
“competitiveness is elusive,” because countries continue to 
exist regardless of economic performance [4]. “The true 
definition of competitiveness is the ability of a region to export 
more in value added terms than it imports” [6].  
Industry competitiveness refers to its ability to innovate and 
is measured by its global export performance [7]. 
Competitiveness does not occur “in a single moment; 
competitiveness emerges and develops consistently in a 
positive or negative way” [5]. In the case of the U.S. and 
Dominican agricultural sectors, it will be important to look at 
the competitiveness of the sector in each country and in each 
other’s markets over a period of time. Furthermore, the current 
trends may be able to offer insight into future competitiveness 
capabilities.  
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III. DETERMINING INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS 
Industry competitiveness is determined by its ability to 
innovate [8] [9], the existence of a competitive environment 
created by the government [8], investment in infrastructure, 
education and training [7], technological progress [8]-[10], 
macroeconomic stability, good governance, market efficiency, 
and institutions [10]. Institution refers to “the legal and 
administrative framework within which individuals, firms, and 
governments interact to generate wealth” [10].  
Economist and researcher Michael Porter’s work has been 
highly influential both in the academic and practical arena when 
discussing industry-level competitiveness. However, it has not 
gone without its share of criticism. For instance, researcher 
Jahir Lombana maintains that the diamond model for 
competitiveness has limited applicability when applied to 
developing countries [5]. For instance, the model discusses 
developing human capital, providing top quality products and 
services, and the government creating an environment to allow 
local producers to become more competitive. Yet, in a number 
of developing countries, the model serves as information rather 
than a solution, considering many of the countries differ in their 
capacity and the structures required to adequately develop the 
resources and strategies needed to compete. Also, while many 
developing countries may be able to produce a substantial 
amount of a product, such as fish or meat, the differences in 
standards and equipment to adequately test food remain, thus 
limiting their ability to compete in markets with certain 
requirements, such as the United States and the European 
Union. Furthermore, the model is limited to the domestic 
context without taking into account the exogenous factors 
within the global economy that may also shape industry 
competitiveness. Exogenous factors may include multinational 
enterprises, because they contribute the tools necessary, such as 
the development of knowledge, for localized and trans-border 
clusters to enhance themselves and compete [11]. To be fair, 
Porter briefly discusses developing countries with different 
types of economies, such as planned economies, and the role of 
domestic firms versus foreign multinational companies in the 
early stages of economic development [8]. 
Regarding the role of government, “companies crossing 
borders become less dependent on a nation-state and need to be 
strategically located to take advantage of their environment and 
in some cases create them” [5]. In other words, multinational 
companies do not rely solely on the environment created by 
local government policy but that created at the international 
level. As a result, more recent studies have shifted toward 
understanding the competitive environment and impact on 
industry competitiveness in developing countries.  
Other studies look beyond the macro and micro-level factors 
that determine competitiveness, which have been labeled as the 
meso-level of analysis [5]. The particular level of analysis 
examines sector-specific policies. Lombana advances upon the 
commonly accepted Porter model of competitiveness. “The 
external sector is included as an analytical separation between 
internal determinants of the domestic field and external 
 
1 Tariff and duty are used interchangeably throughout this piece. 
determinants of the international field,” according to Lombana 
[5]. In his examination of the factors that determine regional 
competitiveness, project manager at the Institute of Forecasting 
and Macroeconomic Research Sharofiddin Nazarov finds that 
the “interaction and interdependent chain of ‘object 
environmental,’ ‘process,’ and ‘project’ elements” are key [12].  
In the case of U.S.-Dominican agricultural trade, 
international policy institutions vis-à-vis trade deals have 
reached the forefront of discussions on competitiveness. For 
instance, executive vice-president of the Dominican Agro-
business Board (JAD – Junta Agroempresarial Dominicana, 
Inc.) Osmar Benitez expressed in a 2010 personal interview in 
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic that because the sensitive 
sectors are harmed by the reduction of the Dominican 
Republic’s tariffs,1 “we need to renegotiate the agreement [DR-
CAFTA].” (Mr. Benitez also served as the negotiator for the 
agricultural sector during the trade talks between the United 
States and the Dominican Republic.) Those sensitive sectors 
include milk, rice, and poultry. In September 2016, Dominican 
producers also asked to renegotiate DR-CAFTA to enhance 
their competitiveness [13]. Perhaps, this signals the need to look 
beyond domestic factors and individual firm strategies toward 
international level institutions and rules.  
IV. A COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH TO INDUSTRY 
COMPETITIVENESS 
The proposed approach builds off of the institutional school 
of thought and narrows the focus to trade rules.  
Within the last 16 years, an increasing number of countries 
have signed and implemented bilateral, regional, and cross-
regional trade agreements. These trade deals establish formal 
binding rules that shape import/export behavior by allowing 
special access to specific markets. As a result, these trade rules 
increase the opportunities to compete in these same markets. 
The findings presented here do not intend to reduce the 
importance of costs, technology, and strategy in the 
competitiveness equation. Rather, the purpose is to add another 
significant layer. For instance, the U.S. textile industry may be 
less cost-competitive in the global market but represents most 
imports for apparel producers in countries, such as the 
Dominican Republic, even though less expensive alternatives 
from Asia exist [15]. The rules governing textile and apparel 
trade between the United States, Central America, and the 
Dominican Republic create an incentive for Latin American 
and Caribbean apparel manufacturers to utilize U.S. textiles to 
gain duty-free access to the U.S. market. As a result, Latin 
American and Caribbean apparel became more competitive in 
the U.S. market as import duties on their clothing exports were 
eliminated.  
Trade rules also impact agricultural competitiveness in 
international markets. In certain sub-sectors, the United States 
represents a large share of Dominican food imports, whereas 
the Dominican Republic has shown tremendous export growth 
to the United States.  
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The study complements existing work on industry 
competitiveness by emphasizing determining factors beyond 
that of the market economy and firm business strategies, more 
specifically the rules within reciprocal trade deals and unilateral 
trade programs. Furthermore, this study underscores 
competitiveness in specific markets rather than the global 
market as a whole. 
V. METHODOLOGY 
The unit of analysis in this study is the industry, specifically 
agriculture. The study explores how the agricultural industry 
can compete in specific markets and finds that trade rules also 
affect the capacity for an industry to do so. Competitiveness is 
determined by one country’s share of total imports of a 
particular product by another country. 
Agriculture has been selected as the specific industry because 
of its economic importance for many countries around the 
world. In the Dominican Republic, agriculture’s share of total 
exports reached as high as 76% throughout the 1960s and 
1970s. By the mid-1980s, that share fell to 55% [16]. By 2014, 
agriculture only accounted for 6.21% of the Dominican 
Republic’s GDP, according to World Bank figures. (Industry 
represents 26.9% of the GDP and services, 66.9%.) 
Nevertheless, agriculture represented the economy’s largest 
employer until the first part of the 21st century. Currently, 
agriculture accounts for 14.4% of the labor force, just behind 
21% for industry [17]. Service sector jobs now provide more 
employment due to the expansion of construction, tourism, and 
free trade zones.  
Qualitative research methods have been used to identify 
another determinant of industry competitiveness. The final 
argument is the result of examining the process leading up to 
the observable outcomes. The process includes the rules 
established under the unilateral 1983 Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), which allows eligible 
countries throughout Central America and the Caribbean to 
export particular goods to the U.S. market free of duties, and 
the reciprocal 2004 DR-CAFTA,2 in which goods from the 
participating Central American countries, the Dominican 
Republic, and the United States can enter each other’s market 
duty-free. The pattern established is worth identifying as a way 
of also offering some insight into what to expect after 2020, 
when nearly all tariffs on agricultural products are removed. 
The use of a single case and causal process tracing allows us to 
incorporate the complex and “dense web of relationships 
connecting states, companies, civil society organizations, and 
individuals as a policymaking system as well as analysis of their 
mutual influences” [18]. In other words, this research design, 
not only explains why certain outcomes occur but how various 
factors lead to these same outcomes. The government 
negotiators, agricultural producers, and business associations 
are incorporated into the analysis in order to comprehend the 
various factors promoting or hindering industry 
competitiveness in a specific market.  
 
2 The Central American members of DR-CAFTA include Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.  
Three goals of causal process tracing have been identified in 
recent literature—case-centric, theory-centric, and theory-
building [18]. The fact that the DR-CAFTA process is still 
unfolding leads to difficulties in applying a strong theory-
centric and theory-building approach to this analysis. For this 
reason, the study relies on the case-centric approach to causal 
process tracing, which is a “detailed narrative that explains how 
a particular outcome or set of events came about” and can be 
used to explain outcomes in a specific case [18]. For instance, 
the study explores international trade rules to test the theory that 
these same rules shape the ability for industries to compete in a 
specific market. However, following DR-CAFTA toward the 
end of the implementation stage may offer clues into its role in 
setting a particular pattern in motion in U.S.-Dominican 
agricultural trade.  
The case-centric approach allows for generalizations among 
comparable cases. The study is limited at the same time, 
because the detailed historical narrative is based on recent 
history, of which a portion is still developing. In addition, the 
study begins a discussion as to the impact of domestic access 
and influence, albeit not static, by different sub-sectors within 
agriculture on the trade rules, which, in turn, shapes the capacity 
to compete.  
VI. U.S.-DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TRADE IN AGRICULTURE AND 
SPECIFIC MARKET COMPETITIVENESS 
This section highlights the trade trends in the specific 
industries that are the focus of this paper—coffee (traditional 
export) and dairy, poultry, and rice (domestic-market oriented 
and sensitive). The trends show the growth or decline of the 
share of the import market for each country to illustrate the 
degree to which these products are competitive in each other’s 
market.  
A. Coffee 
Dominican coffee is among the traditional export sectors, in 
which processors sell the coffee beans to the export market. 
Much of the coffee is produced on small farms, usually less than 
eight acres, which are dispersed throughout the Northern and 
Central mountainous regions of the country. Most Dominican 
coffee goes to the United States, as well as Japan and the U.S. 
territory of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, although the CBERA 
regime encouraged non-traditional exports, coffee remains the 
most consumed beverage in the United States. 
Under CBERA, Dominican coffee exports reached US$34 
million in 1991 and peaked at US$49 million in 1995 before 
dropping down to US$13 million in 1999.  
Dominican coffee exports to the United States climbed over 
2,000 percent from US$324,042 in 2004 to US$7,609,456 in 
2011, according to data collected from the United Nations 
Commodities Trade (UN Comtrade) database. Furthermore, 
Dominican coffee exports increased 27 percent from 2007, the 
same year that DR-CAFTA took effect in the Dominican 
Republic, to 2011.3  
3 Figures from 2012-2015 are not included, because they incorporate coffee, 
tea, mates and spices combined.  
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Fig. 1 Dominican coffee exports to the United States (2000-2011) 
(US$) 
 
Despite the sharp spikes in Dominican coffee exports to the 
United States, they continue to account for less than one percent 
of the U.S. coffee import market. Compared to other upper 
middle income countries in 2011, Dominican coffee appears 
uncompetitive in terms of its share of the U.S. market at only 
0.17%. The Dominican Republic only exported US$7.6 million 
out of a total of US$4.6 billion of U.S. imports from these 
countries, resulting in the former ranking among the top 10 
upper middle income coffee exporters to the United States.  
As with Dominican coffee to the United States, U.S. coffee 
exports to the Dominican Republic have shown a capacity to 
increase in value. U.S. coffee exports jumped from only 
US$59,842 in 2000 to US$291,940 in 2003 to US$172,636 in 
2011. At the same time, U.S. exports represent an insignificant 
share of only two percent of Dominican imports of coffee from 
the world. U.S. coffee exports, when compared to other high-
income economies, reached 27% of the Dominican coffee 
import market from these same economies in 2011.  
 
 
Fig. 2 U.S. coffee exports to the Dominican Republic (2000-2011) 
(US$) 
 
Overall, the Dominican Republic has seen growth under 
CBERA until the mid-1990s. Coffee still received duty free 
access on a Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) status [19]. MFN 
status refers to the tariff rates placed on imports from other 
WTO members equally. Although, CBERA allowed for coffee 
from eligible countries to enter the U.S. market duty-free, the 
United States also removed duties on coffee imports from WTO 
members. Therefore, the benefits of duty-free access for 
Dominican coffee to the U.S. market under CBERA was limited 
by the same duty-free access that was offered to WTO 
members. The same limits of the duty-free access were evident 
under the DR-CAFTA, because Dominican producers still had 
to compete against coffee exporters from the Central American 
members of the trade deal. The limitation of the special access 
under CBERA and DR-CAFTA may partially explain why the 
Dominican coffee still holds an insignificant share of the U.S. 
coffee market.  
The story is the same for U.S. coffee exports to the 
Dominican Republic under DR-CAFTA. In other words, U.S. 
coffee exports have increased in value but their share of the 
Dominican coffee import market remains low. U.S. coffee 
exports under CBERA are not taken into account, since the 
program only provided preferential access to Caribbean Basin 
producers to the U.S. market. As traditional agricultural sectors 
face an increasingly liberal market under DR-CAFTA, the 
study reveals the trade deal’s role in enhancing or hindering 
competitiveness for U.S. and Dominican agricultural producers 
in each other’s market.  
B. Dairy 
Dominican dairy exports to the United States have seen a 
huge increase from only US$130,568 in 2000 to US$4 million 
in 2015. Although there were increases and decreases from 
2000 to 2005, while still under CBERA during the early part of 
this period, Dominican dairy exports began a steady climb from 
2005 to 2015, following the signing of DR-CAFTA. The 
greatest jump was from 2008 and 2009.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Dominican dairy exports to the United States (2000-2015) 
(US$ million) 
 
When compared to other upper middle income countries, the 
Dominican Republic ranked number seven following Jamaica 
and ahead of Colombia with 1.94% of U.S. imports from these 
countries. On the other hand, the U.S. dairy industry has 
increased its exports to the Dominican market. From 2000 to 
2015, U.S. dairy exports to the Dominican Republic jumped 
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387% from US$12 million to US$59 million worth of exports. 
From 2007 to 2008 alone, U.S. dairy exports to the Dominican 
Republic doubled.  
 
 
Fig. 4 US dairy exports to the Dominican Republic (2000-2015) 
(US$) 
 
Compared to other high-income economies, the United 
States represents an 87% share of Dominican dairy imports, 
thus demonstrating its ability to compete in this category.  
C. Poultry  
Dominican poultry exports to the United States are quite 
minimal, yet showed a sharp increase from 2005 to 2010 before 
declining rapidly again from 2010 to 2014. Even with the 
increase, Dominican poultry to the United States remains 
uncompetitive in the U.S. market, accounting for zero percent 
of total U.S. poultry imports.  
 
 
Fig. 5 Dominican Poultry Exports to the United States 
(2004-2007, 2010, 2013, 2014) (US$) 
 
Upper middle-income economies, as a whole, also do not 
represent a significant percentage of U.S. poultry imports. How 
the Dominican poultry industry will fare both domestically and 
in the U.S. market following the full implementation of DR-
CAFTA remains to be seen.  
U.S. poultry exports to the Dominican Republic, on the other 
hand, reached its peak in 2011 with a value of US$3.5 million 
worth of exports. That was a 33% jump from US$2.6 million in 
2000.  
 
 
Fig. 6 U.S. Poultry Exports to the Dominican Republic (2000-2015) 
(US$) 
 
U.S. poultry has proven its ability to compete in the 
Dominican market. U.S. poultry has represented a majority of 
total Dominican poultry imports from the world since 2000. In 
2012, that figure reached 95%.  
 
 
Fig. 7 U.S. Share of Dominican Poultry Imports (2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012) (US$) 
 
U.S. poultry share of Dominican poultry imports continues 
to remain at more than 90%. 
D. Rice 
Dominican rice exports to the United States, increased 
dramatically from only US$2 in 2004 to US$13,000 worth in 
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2014. Despite the huge increase, Dominican rice remains 
uncompetitive at zero percent in the U.S. market when 
compared to both upper middle income economies and the 
world.  
 
 
Fig. 8 Dominican rice exports to the United States 
(2004-2006, 2010, 2012-2014) (US$) 
 
U.S. rice exports to the Dominican Republic showed a sharp 
upturn in 2004 when it peaked at about US$36 million, up from 
just US$2.6 million a year earlier. However, U.S. rice exports 
continued to tumble downward after that. As a matter of fact, 
unlike with the other commodities, U.S. exports dropped 45% 
from 2000 to 2015. The United States is the number one 
exporter to the Dominican market, according to UN Comtrade 
statistics.  
In terms of market share, the United States has proven to 
remain quite competitive with a share ranging from about 60% 
in 2003 to 99% in 2013. That is a large jump from only about 
18% in 2001. 
 
 
Fig. 9 U.S. rice exports to the Dominican Republic (2000-2015) 
(US$) 
In sum, Dominican export-oriented coffee is still not 
competitive in the U.S. market, even under DR-CAFTA. The 
combination of trade policy and increased competition for an 
already vulnerable sector and weak negotiation power at the 
domestic level makes it difficult for the industry to gain. On the 
other hand, the other commodities highlighted in this section 
has enjoyed high levels of influence at the domestic level. 
Furthermore, DR-CAFTA presents opportunities to grow in the 
U.S. market due to the anticipated duty-free access. 
Simultaneously, the heavy competition from producers from all 
around the world may make the rules less advantageous to 
boosting their competitiveness in the U.S. market. On the other 
hand, the rules appear to enhance the competitive advantage of 
US producers in the Dominican market. The next section 
explores how the rules governing U.S.-Dominican agriculture 
trade affect exporters to each other’s market and the role of 
bargaining power on what was placed on the table and the final 
outcome. 
VII. TRADE RULES 
Domestic government policies such as export subsidies 
influence the ability for domestic firms to “expand market 
shares in profitable areas” [14]. International level trade 
policies shape the decisions of importers to purchase goods 
from select markets, although less expensive alternatives exist 
[15]. Consequently, exporting industries will enjoy increased 
preferential access, which has the possibility of becoming 
competitive in that market.  
Within the agricultural provisions, coffee, an export-oriented 
industry, has different rules than the more domestic-oriented 
industries—dairy, poultry and rice--that now have to shift 
toward a bilateral trade regime.  
In addition to the international level rules between the United 
States and the Dominican Republic, domestic trade practices 
also impact the competitiveness of foreign goods in the same 
domestic market. (The United States only placed duties on 
coffee substitutes, containing coffee.) With DR-CAFTA, those 
duties were removed and thus, exports increased. However, 
other U.S. trade practices, specifically non-tariff barriers such 
as sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions, limited the 
effectiveness of CBERA for Dominican coffee in that market.  
 
TABLE I 
AGRICULTURAL COMPETITIVENESS IN A RECIPROCAL TRADE REGIME (%) 
(YEAR) 
Item Dominican Republic in the United States 
United States in the Dominican 
Republic 
Coffee 0.17 (2011) 27 (2011) 
Dairy 1.94 (2015) 87 (2015) 
Poultry 0 (2014) 95 (2012)* 
Rice 0 (2014) 98 (2015) 
Note: Share of comparable economies.  
* Share of total imports from the world. 
 
Prior to DR-CAFTA, the Dominican Republic restricted 
trade through duties. For instance, the Caribbean country 
imposed bound tariffs as high as 40% on agricultural imports 
by the mid-1990s. Bound tariffs are the rates imposed by 
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individual members within the WTO on specific commodities. 
By 2002, the average applied tariff rates on agricultural 
products reached 12.9%. Tariffs on products surpassing the 
quotas, which are restrictions on the volume entering the 
Dominican Republic, reached 118% for chicken and 107% for 
rice by 2002.  
The highest U.S. tariffs apply mainly to agricultural 
products. Tariff rate quotas apply to the import of beef, dairy 
products, sugar, peanuts, tobacco and cotton. Out-of-quota 
tariffs reached up to 350% in 2001.  
The DR-CAFTA serves as a shift from the unilateral trade 
regime under CBERA toward a regime in which member 
countries have preferential access to each other’s market, 
which, in turn, offers some sort of competitive edge. However, 
as research shows, the pattern for Dominican producers in the 
U.S. market remains the same from one regime to the other, 
whereas U.S. agricultural exports to the Dominican Republic 
actually demonstrate an ability to compete. 
A. Coffee 
DR-CAFTA eliminated tariffs on coffee traded between the 
member countries as soon as it took effect. Prior to the start of 
talks between the United States and the Dominican Republic, 
Dominican import tariffs on coffee reached as high as 20 
percent. During this same period, U.S. tariffs on coffee imports 
were already at zero percent at the WTO level and through 
CBERA. While CBERA offered Dominican, as well as other 
Caribbean and Central American coffee, preferential access, the 
benefits were minimal considering that producers from other 
WTO member countries also enjoyed duty-free access to the 
U.S. coffee market.  
The increase in Dominican coffee exports to the United 
States under DR-CAFTA continued to follow a path that had 
already been set by CBERA—duty-free access. Dominican and 
U.S. now have duty-free access to each other’s market. This 
duty-free access under DR-CAFTA is one contributing factor 
to the sharp increase in U.S. coffee exports to the Dominican 
Republic. Notably, U.S. coffee exports to the Dominican 
Republic were more competitive in 2001 with a share of the 
latter’s total imports from the world of 64% compared to only 
2% in 2011. Time will only tell if the DR-CAFTA will set a 
path to restore U.S. coffee competitiveness in the Dominican 
Republic. On the other hand, the on-going tariff free access to 
the U.S. market helped Dominican coffee exports to increase 
but not in terms of market share. An already vulnerable industry 
has not been able to compete against other suppliers to the U.S. 
market from comparable economies and from around the globe 
in general. The question becomes how to create trade deals that 
set a path that actually allow for competition in the 21st century, 
especially for traditional export sectors such as coffee. 
The rules for the sensitive products that are domestic-
oriented in the Dominican Republic allow for protection for a 
period of time that ranges from 10-20 years. The analysis of 
trade rules presented here focuses on how the DR-CAFTA rules 
set a path that may help or hinder competitiveness for these 
industries upon the complete opening of U.S.-Dominican 
agricultural trade.  
B. Dairy 
The duty rates on Dominican milk will be phased out over a 
10 to 20 year period. More specifically, powdered milk tariffs 
will be eliminated to zero within a 20 year time frame. Liquid 
milk received 10 years of protection. Tariffs and quotas on 
liquid milk were eliminated on January 1, 2015. 
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
the United States remains the top supplier of non-fat dried milk 
(NFDM) to the Dominican Republic. As a matter of fact, in 
2014, the United States accounted for 89% of total Dominican 
NFDM imports from the world both in volume and value. The 
volume of Dominican NFDM imports from the United States 
increased from under 2,000 metric tons in 2007 to more than 
8,000 metro tons in 2014. U.S. share of Dominican liquid 
imports from the world increased by 2014 yet only represented 
a 9.7% share of the market, according to the USDA. U.S. share 
of powdered milk imports from the world by the Dominican 
Republic also saw an increase following the implementation of 
DR-CAFTA, whereas the top supplier of powdered milk to the 
Dominican Republic, Denmark, experienced a decrease in its 
market share. 
Dominican dairy exports to the United States increased since 
DR-CAFTA took effect. However, its exports still remain 
small. According to the USDA, cheese and margarine represent 
the top two dairy products that are formally exported, and 99% 
of those exports go to the United States. From 2007 to 2014, 
cheese exports increased 31% in terms of volume and 59%, 
dollar value.  
Under DR-CAFTA, tariffs and quotas on fresh cheese, 
cottage cheese, molten cheese and soft cheese were also 
eliminated on January 1, 2015. Tariffs and quotas on cheddar 
cheese will be completely removed in 2020 and mozzarella 
cheese, 2025.  
C. Poultry 
Dominican tariffs on poultry, particularly chicken leg 
quarters, will also be eliminated within a 20-year period and 
sooner for some poultry products, as in the case of other poultry 
that are not chicken leg quarters. These items face a 10 year 
tariff elimination, which means that they were eliminated in 
2015. U.S. tariffs on Dominican poultry imports remain at zero 
as a result of CBERA. Even with this information, there is not 
any data because the Dominican poultry industry is not an 
export-oriented industry. Nevertheless, the current trade regime 
under DR-CAFTA forces poultry producers to develop 
strategies to compete internationally. On the other hand, U.S. 
poultry exports to the Dominican Republic actually accounted 
for 93% of the latter’s imports from the world in 2014, a slight 
drop from 97% in 2005.  
Overall, the trade rules established under CBERA and DR-
CAFTA have allowed for increased access for Dominican 
producers in the U.S. market and vice-versa. Yet, when 
examined in terms of competitiveness, Dominican producers 
rank quite low in the U.S. market. A number of internal and 
external factors limit the ability of Dominican producers to 
benefit from the competitive advantage offered by trade 
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programs and trade deals whereas U.S. producers are able to do 
so.  
D. Rice 
Lastly, in the case of U.S.-Dominican rice trade, DR-CAFTA 
allows for tariffs to remain at current levels for 10 years. 
Beginning the 11th year, tariffs will be phased out until their 
complete elimination by the 20th year. There was a concern 
about the influx from the United States. Oxfam estimated that 
the DR-CAFTA would prove harmful for Dominican rice 
producers and result in the loss of a main source of financing 
[20]. The same organization estimates that by the end of the 
transition period, the loss of fiscal revenues would increase 
from 0.73% to 0.78% of GDP [20]. Unless rice producers 
develop an effective export strategy that will allow them to take 
advantage of DR-CAFTA and compete both at home and in the 
U.S. market, the trade deal will prove anything but beneficial.  
Current trade trends already show the benefit of DR-CAFTA 
to U.S. rice producers in the Dominican market. The U.S. share 
of the Dominican rice market increased from only 18% in 2000 
to 98% in 2015. U.S. domination of this market will more than 
likely continue, especially when tariffs are eliminated 
altogether within the next decade. 
VIII. INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE RULE INFLUENCE 
The Dominican agricultural sector played an active role in 
the trade negotiations from the side room, known as the cuarto 
de al lado in Spanish, between the United States and the 
Dominican Republic, despite opposition to a trade deal in the 
beginning. This section just shows how the Dominican 
agricultural producers had access to the rule-setting process and 
influenced the negotiating agenda.  
In the case of the association representing Dominican coffee 
producers, National Union of Coffee Producers of the North 
(UNACAFEN – Union de Asociaciones de Caficultores del 
Norte). UNACAFEN had access to but not much influence on 
the proposals put forth at the bargaining table. 
During the negotiation process, only one individual from 
UNACAFEN participated in the first round in Santo Domingo, 
Dominican Republic and traveled to Washington, D.C. for the 
last round of the DR-CAFTA negotiations. Leo Valverde, the 
head of UNACAFEN, was the only person who represented the 
coffee interests during the negotiations. “During the rounds, we 
already had some information but not the capacity to make 
demands,” said the president of the Dominican Coffee 
Confederation (CONCAFED – Confederación Cafetalera 
Dominicana) Rufino Herrera Puello in a June 2010 personal 
interview in the Dominican Republic. Other representatives 
from the regional coffee associations attended government-
coordinated seminars about DR-CAFTA but had little input. 
Instead, as the same coffee association representative described 
it, during the meetings leading up to DR-CAFTA, the 
government basically informed them of the benefits of DR-
CAFTA and moved forward with the negotiations. Yet, 
documents for meetings such as that on Jan. 30, 2004 indicate 
that representatives from JAD, which represents all agro-
businesses, addressed issues pertaining to coffee. 
Unfortunately, the industry did not have a clearly defined 
position during the three rounds of the DR-CAFTA 
negotiations. Coffee producers expressed concerns about low 
productivity and increased competition from the Central 
American producers. However, these concerns were raised well 
after the negotiations had concluded. As a result, it was much 
easier for the Dominican Republic to move forward with its 
proposals with minimal consideration of the preferences and 
proposals by the coffee sector. The Dominican negotiators 
agreed to allow for immediate market opening for non-roasted 
coffee and a tariff rate quota reduction schedule of 15 years 
until January 1, 2020 for roasted coffee.  
The National Council for the Regulation and Development 
of Dairy Industry (CONALECHE – Consejo Nacional para la 
Reglamentación y Fomento de la Industria Lechera), an 
association created by government decree in 2001, actively 
represented the interests of the milk producers. Dominican milk 
producers were concerned about their inability to compete 
against U.S. imports that benefited from U.S. subsidies and 
advanced technology, according to Diego Blanco from Nestlé 
Dominicana during a May 2010 personal interview in Santo 
Domingo, Dominican Republic. CONALECHE members 
consulted regularly with the government negotiators and 
presented clear goals, which the latter put forth at the 
negotiating table. For instance, CONALECHE played a role in 
shaping the state’s proposal establishing a quota system for 
dairy imports such as milk and cheese. According to records 
obtained in the Dominican Republic, CONALECHE met with 
the agricultural negotiating team on January 30, 2004 and 
proposed a base quantity of 230 metric tons of liquid milk 
entering the Dominican Republic and the highest level of 
protection possible. The government negotiators stated publicly 
that one of its objectives was to obtain “the major level of 
protection possible for…milk” because it was one of the 
Dominican Republic’s 10 sensitive products. This goal was 
reflected in the government negotiators’ proposal of a 6.66% 
annual reduction on the import of liquid milk from the United 
States over a 15 year period until Jan. 1, 2020. In the case of 
CONALECHE and the Dominican government negotiation 
team, the outcome of the DR-CAFTA shows success in 
achieving the aforementioned objective for powdered milk but 
fell short for liquid milk. Powdered milk received 20 years of 
protection whereas liquid milk, only 10.  
The National Council of Poultry Production (CONAPROPE 
– Consejo Nacional de Producción Pecuaria) was also very 
instrumental in presenting the interests of the Dominican 
poultry producers to the government negotiators. 
CONAPROPE was created by government decree no. 351-82 
on Oct. 16, 1982 to work with the state in the formation, 
conduction and execution of policies for the benefit of the 
poultry sector. Following the critique of the negotiations, the 
government negotiating team invited poultry producers to a 
working meeting, scheduled for Jan. 23, 2004, leading up to the 
second round of negotiations. In an interview with the 
Dominican newspaper Listín Diario, CONAPROPE president 
Francisco Leonis Fernández mentioned that the producers 
backed the government negotiators [21]. At the same time, the 
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association asked that the negotiating team defend the positions 
that were agreed upon during meetings leading up to the first 
round of negotiations. The producers asked for a tariff reduction 
schedule of 10 to 20 years for poultry, which is what the 
negotiating team put forward. In the end, the producers and 
negotiators received what they wanted—a protection period of 
20 years. 
Finally, the Dominican Association of Rice Producers 
(ADOFA – Asociación Dominicana de Factorías de Arroz) 
demonstrated significant access and influence on the proposals 
that the negotiating team put forward. ADOFA originally 
sought 20 years of tariff reduction, which the Dominican 
Republic put forward. The United States wanted 15 years, but 
in the end the deal included 20 years of protection for the 
Dominican rice producers.  
In the end, the producers for the sensitive industries got what 
they wanted because of their long history of political access and 
influence and capacity to provide the information required to 
support their desired positions. However, the final rules may not 
be truly beneficial. Rather, the final agreement is “like a time 
bomb,” as described by U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) economic policy coordinator Luis 
González in a February 2010 personal interview. He went 
further to say that in those 20 years, the government will have 
to help producers to adapt to compete to avoid a collapse of the 
industry. The Dominican agriculture sector’s experience with 
the U.S. market in a reciprocal trade regime offers lessons for 
the same industries in the comparable economy of Cuba.  
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CUBA  
Cuba’s agricultural sector is comparable with that of the 
Dominican Republic in a number of ways. The sector represents 
a small portion of the GDP of only four percent [22]. However, 
the sector employs 20 percent of the working population [22]. 
Similar to the Dominican Republic, Cuba is an upper middle-
income country. Its GDP reached US$77.15 billion in 2013 
(latest reported data) compared to the Dominican Republic’s 
US$67.1 billion in 2015, per World Bank figures. Some of the 
main agricultural commodities include coffee, rice, sugar and 
citrus and tropic fruits, similar to the Dominican Republic. 
Whereas the USAID is encouraging organic production in the 
Dominican Republic, “Cuba is a global leader in the production 
of organic agriculture” [22].  
Because agricultural production has declined tremendously, 
Cuba imports about 80% of its food, which amounts to roughly 
US$1.5 billion per year [22]. For years, the United States 
remained the largest supplier of food to Cuba, which is allowed 
under the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export 
Enhancement Act. In recent years, U.S. share of the Cuban 
market has declined due to increased competition from other 
global suppliers. As a matter of fact, U.S. food suppliers’ share 
of the Cuban market dropped to third place behind the European 
Union and Brazil in 2015. Nevertheless, new opportunities exist 
with the restoration of diplomatic relations between the United 
States and Cuba and the easing of restrictions on U.S. trade with 
and travel to the island. A 2015 report by the USDA anticipates 
that political economic reforms would help U.S. agricultural 
producers and exporters to compete in the market and meet the 
needs of Cuban consumers [23].  
In addition to discussing the political and economic reforms 
in the two countries and their benefits to U.S. exporters, it is 
important to also think about how trade programs and, 
potentially, trade deals can also boost the competitiveness of 
producers in developing nations. Using the findings from the 
case of the Dominican Republic, the study includes suggestions 
for the Cuban agricultural sector to establish its presence as a 
competitor in the U.S. market when economic relations 
between the two countries are fully restored. Should Cuba and 
the United States enter into any form of trade talks, here are a 
few bargaining-related items for Cuba to consider: 
1) Develop a national strategy for international-level trade 
negotiations prior to entering into trade talks.  
2) Create room for semi-autonomous and/or autonomous 
private sector associations to represent the needs and 
interests of producers. 
3) Enhance the organizational and informational capacity of 
the agricultural sector. 
4) Establish the capacity for both government and business 
associations to bargain successfully during trade talks. 
5) Promote financing for resources necessary to actively and 
effectively participate in trade negotiations.  
X. CONCLUSION 
In sum, trade rules can either help or hinder the capacity to 
compete, as evident by the unilateral and reciprocal trade rules 
governing U.S.-Dominican agricultural trade. The study is 
limited by the fact that data showing the trends in U.S.-
Dominican agricultural trade before the 1990s is not available 
via UN Comtrade and other alternative databases. Secondly, 
DR-CAFTA has yet to be fully implemented, which makes it 
difficult to adequately explore this shift and the resulting pattern 
that emerges in terms of competing in each other’s market.  
Future research would strengthen the findings presented here 
in several ways. An extension of this study to offer a more in-
depth historical overview and clearer pattern set by CBERA and 
DR-CAFTA would include more cases, which would be the 
countries throughout Central America. Furthermore, a thorough 
analysis of the role of the industry associations in setting the 
agenda to determine the rules that impact their ability to 
compete would offer greater insight into what determines 
business association access and influence, which is beyond the 
scope of the work presented here. Aligning with the research 
design, future work would also incorporate other factors that 
shape competitiveness of sensitive agricultural industries under 
the new trade regime. Some of those factors include domestic 
policies over time and political leverage from a historical 
perspective. 
To enhance recommendations for Cuba, future research 
would also identify the current structure of business-state 
relations in Cuba, especially as the Cuban economy gradually 
opens, to offer greater useful, practical and feasible 
recommendations for potential future trade talks. Nevertheless, 
the argument presented in this study advances scholarly 
discussions surrounding competing in a global economy by 
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turning our attention to the rules that govern international trade 
between specific markets. This information is especially useful 
for the sensitive agricultural industries as they shift from 
focusing mainly on local production toward export 
competitiveness. Furthermore, the study has practical 
implications for comparable economies, as in the case of Cuba, 
by suggesting ways in which a country can develop its 
international trade negotiating capacity in an effort to boost the 
competitiveness of its producers.  
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